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Abstract
Compensatory green beliefs (CGBs) reflect the idea that a pro-environmental 
behavior (e.g., recycling) can off-set the negative effects of an environmentally 
detrimental behavior (e.g., driving). It is thought that CGBs might help explain 
why people act in ways that appear to contradict their pro-environmental 
intentions, and inconsistently engage in pro-environmental behaviors. The 
present study sought to investigate the nature and use of CGBs. A series of 
interviews suggested that participants endorsed CGBs to (a) reduce feelings 
of guilt with respect to (the assumed or actual) negative environmental 
impact of their actions and (b) defend their green credentials in social 
situations. Participants also justified detrimental behaviors on the basis of 
higher loyalties (e.g., family’s needs), or the perceived difficulty of performing 
more pro-environmental actions. In addition to shedding light on how, when, 
and why people might hold and use CGBs, the research also provides new 
insight into how CGBs should be assessed.
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Most people are inconsistent in their engagement in pro-environmental 
behaviors (Lynn, 2014). For example, they may carefully recycle their house-
hold goods, but then fly abroad on holiday. There is, therefore, a need to find 
ways to better understand and promote sustained engagement in pro-environ-
mental behaviors (American Psychological Association, 2015). One current 
topic of interest in this regard is “spillover” (see, Nilsson, Bergquist, & 
Schultz, 2017). Spillover is the extent to which engaging in one behavior 
influences the likelihood of engaging in a subsequent behavior. This may be 
a different behavior, or the same behavior enacted in a different time or con-
text (Austin, Cox, Barnett, & Thomas, 2011; Nilsson et al., 2017). For exam-
ple, those introducing a recycling scheme at work might anticipate that this 
will lead employees to recycle at home. Nurturing “positive spillover” effects 
is a potentially cost-effective means of reducing the environmental conse-
quences of human activity (see Department for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs [DEFRA], 2008).
Although there are good reasons to expect that encouraging people to 
engage in one pro-environmental behavior will drive them to engage in other 
pro-environmental behavior (e.g., cognitive dissonance theory, Festinger, 
1957; self-perception theory, Bem, 1972), sometimes the opposite is found. 
“Negative spillover” effects refer to circumstances where the performance of 
one behavior (e.g., recycling) reduces the likelihood that someone will per-
form a complementary behavior (e.g., conserve water; for reviews, see Dolan 
& Galizzi, 2015; Nilsson et al., 2017). Thus, whereas positive spillover is 
generally desirable and explains consistencies in people’s behavior, negative 
spillover is typically more problematic, explaining not only the inconsisten-
cies in people’s pro-environmental (and other) actions but also the limited 
effects of some behavior change interventions.
According to a recent conceptual review, negative spillover in environ-
mental behavior is related to notions of “rebound” and “moral licensing” 
(see, Nilsson et al., 2017). In the context of environmental actions, rebound 
effects typically refer to situations where technological advancements (e.g., 
making goods more efficient) not only reduce costs but also—potentially as 
a consequence—increase use, and so the net impact on the environment is 
unchanged (e.g., Alcott, 2005; Berkhout, Muskens, & Velthuijsen, 2000; 
Sorrell, 2009). For example, someone might purchase a new, more fuel-effi-
cient car, but drive it more frequently because the costs of running the car are 
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reduced. It is also possible for rebound effects to be “indirect,” whereby sav-
ings resulting from one behavior increase a different behavior. For example, 
by conserving energy at home, individuals might save money on their house-
hold bills, but then spend these savings on air travel (see, for example, 
Chitnis, Sorrell, Druckman, Firth, & Jackson, 2013; Sorrell, 2009).
Psychological processes, such as moral licensing, may underlie such 
rebound effects. Moral licensing is a form of self-licensing (Miller & Effron, 
2010), where a moral action is seen to permit a subsequent immoral action 
(Nilsson et al., 2017). For example, individuals might use their efforts to 
conserve energy at home (a relatively moral behavior) to justify their deci-
sion to drive a desirable but inefficient car (a less moral action). Thus, people 
seem to use a kind of moral bank account, whereby “good” deeds yield credit 
that is then redeemed against later “bad” deeds (see, Dolan & Galizzi, 2015). 
The term moral licensing is generally used to refer to situations where the 
performance of a “good” behavior (X) is used to justify a later “bad” behavior 
(Y). However, there is also evidence that things can work the other way 
around—namely, that people sometimes seek to atone for (or purge) an initial 
“bad” behavior (Y) by performing a “good” behavior (X) later (see Dolan & 
Galizzi, 2015). Like licensing, this “purging” might explain apparent incon-
sistencies in people’s moral behavior (including pro-environmental 
behavior).
Although a number of studies support the impact of moral licensing on 
environmentally significant behavior, the psychological processes underly-
ing such licensing are not yet fully understood (Blanken, van de Ven, & 
Zeelenberg, 2015; Nilsson et al., 2017). There is, though, evidence that “per-
mitting” and “purging” spillovers could be driven by a form of “compensa-
tory ethics” designed to maintain a particular self-image in response to a 
perceived threat (Zhong, Ku, Lount, & Murnigham, 2010). In short, these 
behaviors could result from people trying to strike a balance between con-
flicting goals and desires (e.g., enjoying driving an inefficient, but glamor-
ous, car and wanting to also be seen as concerned about the environment). 
The current research was, therefore, designed to learn more about the way(s) 
that people rationalize, justify, or license behavior(s) that have a negative 
impact on the environment.
Compensatory Beliefs
People often use compensatory beliefs as a way of rationalizing (or justify-
ing) behaviors that are not in line with their values or long-term goals 
(Knäuper, Rabiau, Cohen, & Patriciu, 2004; Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 
2006). Much of the work to date has been conducted in relation to health 
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goals where, for instance, people evoke such beliefs as a means of condoning 
unhealthy behavior. For example, Monson, Knäuper, and Kronick (2008) 
found that dieters spontaneously generated compensatory beliefs when faced 
with tempting but highly calorific foods (e.g., planning to eat less at their next 
meal). Compensatory beliefs are, therefore, considered to be a cognitive 
strategy for those seeking an “optimal balance between maximising pleasure 
and minimizing harm” (Rabiau et al., 2006, p. 139). They offer an appealing 
solution to individuals experiencing goal conflict (e.g., to be healthy, to expe-
rience pleasure), enabling them to act in a way that is incongruent with one of 
the goals, while also retaining the belief that they are still committed to that 
goal. For this reason, compensatory beliefs can be seen as a means by which 
people maintain a positive self-image while engaging in behaviors that con-
flict with their longer term goals (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015).
Just as there are situations in which people are tempted to justify engaging 
in unhealthy behaviors, there are also likely to be situations in which people 
feel the need to justify engaging in environmentally detrimental behaviors. 
For example, many carbon-intensive behaviors (e.g., air travel, eating red 
meat, driving) may be deemed desirable by many individuals, leading to a 
psychological conflict for those individuals who simultaneously appreciate 
the need to be pro-environmental. It is, therefore, possible that people acti-
vate compensatory beliefs to license the environmentally harmful transgres-
sion, while protecting their self-image. For example, people might trade off 
an act of recycling at home against the decision not to recycle at work. As 
with compensatory beliefs in the health domain, however, there may be prob-
lems with such logic; particularly, where the intended compensatory behavior 
is either not sufficiently compensatory and/or is not followed through.
Despite the potential importance of compensatory beliefs in helping to 
explain why people behave in ways that have a negative impact on the envi-
ronment, research on whether and how notions of compensation are used in 
such circumstances is very much in its infancy. Indeed, the extant empirical 
work on the topic only provides a partial account of whether, when, why, and 
how so-called compensatory green beliefs (or CGBs) are held and/or acted 
upon. Furthermore, although there is evidence that people will sometimes 
hold and endorse CGBs (e.g., Kaklamanou, Jones, Webb, & Walker, 2015; 
Meijers, Noordewier, & Avramova, 2014), understanding more about the 
nature and the extent of their use has, to date, proven challenging.
Existing Research on CGBs
Kaklamanou et al. (2015) developed a scale for measuring the extent to which 
people endorse various CGBs. An online survey not only found evidence that 
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people endorse compensatory statements relating to environmentally signifi-
cant behaviors but also found that people who endorsed CGBs tended to have 
weaker pro-environmental worldviews (see, Dunlap, Kent, Mertig, & Jones, 
2000), weaker “green” identities (see Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010), and 
reported engaging in fewer ecological behaviors (see, Kaiser, Wölfing, & 
Fuhrer, 1999). Nevertheless, although Kaklamanou et al. did find some evi-
dence that people endorse CGBs (and that the endorsement of CGBs pre-
dicted environmental behavior over and above green identity and ecological 
worldviews), questions were raised over the extent to which people actually 
use CGBs to justify their actions. Indeed, endorsement of the CGBs was quite 
low (each belief was endorsed by around 8% of the sample). However, 
Kaklamanou et al. also identified some potential issues with the measure of 
CGBs that could explain the relatively low levels of endorsement observed. 
For example, there was anecdotal evidence that some participants did not like 
the strict nature of the statements (i.e., that Behavior X always compensates 
for Behavior Y). Instead, they viewed the validity and relevance of the com-
pensation as more context dependent (i.e., that Behavior X sometimes com-
pensates for Behavior Y).
The Present Research
The present research was designed to better understand the use of compensa-
tory beliefs as a mechanism for self-licensing environmentally detrimental 
behavior. Specifically, we were interested in learning more about what kinds of 
trade-offs people deem to be acceptable and in what contexts, and in under-
standing more about how people use CGBs to permit or license engaging in 
behaviors that have a negative impact on the environment. A subsidiary aim of 
the research was to further investigate the efficacy of the measure developed by 
Kaklamanou et al. (2015) for assessing people’s endorsement and use of CGBs. 
To achieve these aims, participants first took part in a “think-aloud” exercise 
(see Ericsson & Simon, 1980), where they were required to verbalize their 
thoughts while completing the self-report measure developed by Kaklamanou 
et al. (2015). The topics and issues raised during this task were then explored in 
greater depth in a subsequent semistructured interview.
Method
Participants
Participants were contacted during the Spring of 2013 via a mailing list main-
tained by a university in the North of England, and community groups (e.g., 
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a church, a school, and an environmental charity). In total, 41 participants 
took part, which is a comparable number of participants with other studies 
using think-aloud paradigms (e.g., Darker & French, 2009; Kaklamanou, 
Armitage, & Jones, 2013), and also other research that has interviewed peo-
ple to explore their beliefs about environmental issues (e.g., Caperello & 
Kurani, 2012; Kaplan, Kaplan, & Austin, 2008). One participant was excluded 
because he did not talk out loud while completing the think-aloud exercise, 
leaving 40 participants in the final sample. Participants were given £15 for 
their time. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 65 years with 53% indicating 
that they were aged between 22 and 44 years. Nineteen participants (48%) 
were male, and 31 (78%) were educated to degree level or above. Thirty-two 
participants (80%) were White British with the remaining participants clas-
sifying themselves as White Other (n = 4), Asian (n = 2), White Irish (n = 1), 
or “Other” (n = 1).
Measures
CGB Scale. The original 20-item scale created by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) 
was used as a stimulus for the think-aloud exercise. This included four items 
that did not feature in the final published version of the scale (e.g., “It is okay 
to have lots of electrical items if you turn them off when not in use”). All the 
other items were from the final published scale (e.g., “Not driving a car com-
pensates for flying on holiday”). This measure can be seen in the online 
appendix. Participants responded to the items using a five-point scale, 
anchored by strongly disagree and strongly agree (coded 1-5). Participants 
were given the following instructions:
Below are a series of beliefs that people may hold about energy, water, transport, 
and the environment. Please read each sentence carefully (out loud) and rate 
how closely the statement reflects YOUR own beliefs by marking the 
appropriate box. Since we all believe different things, there are no right or 
wrong answers.
Participants also completed the following measures:
General Ecological Behavior (GEB) Scale. This measure (Kaiser et al., 1999) was 
adapted by Kaklamanou et al. (2015) who removed seven of the 65 items 
because they were deemed inappropriate for a U.K. sample (e.g., “after 
meals, I dispose of leftovers in the toilet”), and adapted the items to ensure 
that they were framed in terms likely to be familiar in the United Kingdom 
(e.g., “miles” not “kilometers”). Response options were binary (yes/no).
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Revised New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale. This 15-item scale (Dunlap 
et al., 2000) explores human–environmental interactions (e.g., “we are 
approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support”). 
Responses were recorded using a five-point scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree (coded 1-5).
Green Identity Scale. Four items from Whitmarsh and O’Neill’s (2010) Green 
Identity Scale (e.g., “I think of myself as someone who is very concerned 
with environmental issues”) were included. The items were measured on a 
five-point scale, anchored by strongly agree and strongly disagree (coded 
1-5).
Beliefs about climate change were measured by modifying three items 
used by Spence, Venables, Pidgeon, Poortinga, and Demski (2010). The 
first item assessed participants’ general belief in climate change (“Do you 
think that the world’s climate is changing?” yes/no/do not know). The sec-
ond item assessed participants’ level of personal concern about climate 
change (“How concerned are you about climate change?” four-point scale 
[coded 1-4]: not at all concerned, not very concerned, fairly concerned, 
very concerned, and a “don’t know” option). The third item asked partici-
pants about the extent to which they perceived that humans were a cause 
of climate change (“If you believe the world’s climate is changing, to what 
degree do you think it is caused by humankind?” not at all caused by 
humankind/caused partly by humankind/caused entirely by humankind/
not sure).
Think-aloud exercise. Participants were asked to report their thoughts while 
completing the questionnaire designed to measure endorsement of various 
CGBs. Participants first familiarized themselves with the think-aloud proce-
dure by articulating their thoughts while responding to four items designed to 
measure compensatory health beliefs (e.g., that “Smoking can be compen-
sated for by physical activity”). The researcher provided the following 
instructions for the think-aloud exercise—adapted from French, Cook, 
McLean, Williams, and Sutton (2007):
As you complete this short questionnaire I want you to tell me everything that 
you are thinking from the moment you read the question to when you complete 
it. You don’t need to plan what you are going to say. Act as if you were by 
yourself and talking to yourself alone. For this reason, I will wait outside the 
room while you complete the task. You must keep talking. You will be prompted 
if you are silent for more than 10 seconds. You can ask any questions now or 
after this practice exercise.
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Semistructured interview. Participants took part in a semistructured interview 
immediately after the think-aloud exercise. Questions were designed to 
explore whether, when, why, and how CGBs may be held or acted upon, and 
to clarify participants’ responses to the think-aloud exercise. Table 1 sum-
marizes the questions.
Thematic analysis procedure. The data from the think-aloud exercise and 
semistructured interviews were transcribed verbatim. The primary coder 
assigned conceptual labels to topics that were then refined through a pro-
cess of repeated examination (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Hannes, Janssens, & 
Wets, 2009). These codes were compiled into a manual that captured recur-
ring themes. Secondary coding, conducted by another researcher, served to 
further refine the manual (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This was an iterative 
process whereby the coding of randomly selected transcripts from each data 
set (think-aloud and interview) were discussed, with the codes being revised 
as necessary (Darker & French, 2009; Trickett & Trafton, 2009). This pro-
cess was repeated three times for a total of 15 transcripts from each data set 
and any disagreements were resolved jointly through discussion. The final 
coding manual was then applied to the remaining transcripts by the primary 
coder.
Results
Quantitative Findings
Participants tended to have a reasonably strong green identity (M = 4.37, 
SD = 0.58), and a relatively pro-ecological worldview (M = 3.91, SD = 0.56). 
On average, participants engaged in 58% of the pro-environmental behaviors 
listed in the General Environmental Behavior Scale. The majority of partici-
pants (92.50%) agreed that the climate was changing, with 82.50% attribut-
ing climate change partly or entirely to human activity. Ninety percent of the 
participants were concerned by climate change (M = 3.22, SD = 0.70) and 
82.50% believed that something could be done to tackle it.
Participants tended not to endorse CGBs (M = 1.83, SD = 0.47) and agree-
ment with individual items from the scale was low (M = 9.97%, range = 
0.00%-28.21%). Endorsement of CGBs was negatively correlated with eco-
logical behavior (r = −.37, n = 39, p = .020), worldview (r = −.43, n = 39, p 
= .007), and green identity (r = −.54, n = 39, p < .001). In short, participants 
with weaker green identities, weaker pro-ecological worldviews, and who 
engaged in fewer pro-ecological behaviors were more likely to endorse 
CGBs.
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Qualitative Findings
Although participants’ written responses suggested that they typically dis-
agreed with the statements describing compensation, their verbal comments 
during the exercise suggested that there were instances where participants rec-
ognized and endorsed the notion of compensation in relation to their environ-
mentally significant behavior:
I suppose in a sense I am trading one off against the other and saying “well I’m 
allowed a bath once every couple of months if I have a shower all the rest of the 
time.” (P09, female, 65 years or above)
I’ll often catch the school bus or I’ll walk in the morning to school and then I 
often think well I’ve cut down on that so if I’m going out in the evening I ask 
my dad to give me a lift. (P19, male, 17-18 years)
Table 1. Summary of Interview Questions.
Type of question Question
Interview 1.   How did you find that (i.e., the think-aloud 
exercise)? What did you think of the list of 
statements?
2.   What do you think about the idea of 
“compensating”? In other words, the belief that 
performing a positive behavior (e.g., switching to 
a “green” energy tariff) can somehow compensate 
for performing a negative behavior (e.g., leaving the 
heating on while not at home).
3.   How effective do you think these compensatory 
actions might be? Can you think of an example?
4.   Can you think of a time when you have done 
something, which you thought was bad for the 
environment and tried to make up for it in some 
way?
5.   Have you heard people say things similar to the 
statements on the list?
Follow-up questions 
on think-aloud task
1.   You did not say very much about why you agreed/
disagreed with statement X what were you thinking? 
Why did you say that?
2.   You seemed unsure about how to respond to 
statement X. Can you tell me more about why you 
were unsure?
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Rather than forming a specific, prospective intention to compensate for envi-
ronmentally detrimental actions, compensations tended to be retrospective, 
involving past or ongoing behaviors that seemed relatively habitual (i.e., that 
were performed repeatedly in similar situations; Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006). 
Participants talked, for example, about striking an overall balance between their 
more and less environmental behaviors, suggesting that they saw compensation 
on a cumulative/holistic level rather than on a behavior-to-behavior basis:
By trying to keep everything else, like buying food and keeping electrical 
things turned off . . . by trying to keep that as a whole, sort of more green, then 
I’m hoping to have a more positive effect on the environment or less of a 
negative effect, if you like . . . I try to look at it like a sum of all parts rather than 
each individual activity. (P36, female, 22-34 years)
The cumulative and holistic nature of the compensatory beliefs expressed 
by our participants makes the beliefs somewhat different from the statements 
that feature in the measure of CGBs developed by Kaklamanou et al. (2015), 
where single, predefined compensatory actions are pitted against one another. 
The finding that participants referred to habitual behaviors could also explain 
why the CGBs expressed by participants in the present research tended to be 
primarily retrospective (i.e., “I did X, so it is okay to do Y”) rather than pro-
spective (i.e., “I have done Y, so I need to do X”). In other words, participants 
seemed to use CGBs to resolve conflict within their current/past routines 
rather than to justify and plan future action.
Moral objections. Although participants generally recognized the idea of compen-
sation, some disagreed with the notion of behavioral compensation outright, feel-
ing that any attempt to balance their environmental impact would compromise 
their goal of living more sustainably. These participants argued that, wherever 
possible, people should act pro-environmentally and not make compromises:
I don’t think we can afford to be doing all this compensation [ . . . ] I think we 
are just going to have to accept that we are going to have to live different kinds 
of lifestyles and that we may just not be able to do things that we now do. (P06, 
female, 65 years or above)
[A]t the end of the day the point is to save the environment and . . . not to 
compensate. (P19, male, 17-18 years)
“Little Green Lies”: Endorsing CGBs despite doubting their efficacy. Although partici-
pants in the present research did recognize—and in some cases endorse—CGBs, 
they also expressed doubts regarding the overall efficacy of compensatory 
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actions. This concern arose principally from the complexity of calculating 
whether, or to what extent, a positive action would actually compensate for the 
negative effects of another action:
I mean, it depends really . . . if you don’t drive a car can you go abroad on 
holiday? You know, does it compensate? It depends where you’re going, how 
many times you’re flying per year and how many times you’re using the car. 
It’s kind of a grey area question. (P40, male, 22-34 years)
This finding was also supported by evidence from the think-aloud exercise, 
which suggested that participants found it difficult to compare the impact of differ-
ent activities, particularly when these were in different domains (e.g., saving water 
to permit using more energy). Indeed, in some cases, participants found the com-
pensations outlined within the measure of CGBs to be obscure and/or illogical:
I would never have put those two together [Flying abroad can be made up for 
by being a vegetarian]. (P08, female, 65 years or above)
Interestingly, participants seemed to exploit their uncertainty surrounding 
the environmental impact of different behaviors to justify engaging in the one 
most likely to benefit them personally:
We have got quite a small dishwasher it’s a really slim one and I’ve read things 
that say “dishwashers use less water than washing up by hand” and so I kind of 
justify it in my head by saying “oh well, I’m at least using maybe the same 
amount of water.” But in the back of my head I think it’s this big piece of 
equipment that’s doing my dishes for me so I think I’m just trying to convince 
myself as it’s easier. (P10, female, 22-34 years)
In short, there was evidence that participants were willing to use CGBs to 
justify certain actions to themselves without necessarily considering or 
obtaining evidence for the actual efficacy of the compensation.
Why and how do people use CGBs? There was evidence that holding and 
endorsing CGBs had psychological benefits for participants. By being able to 
license the negative environmental impact of their actions by, for example, 
drawing attention to their green credentials, participants seemed able to 
reduce negative feelings, and feel more positive about their overall impact on 
the environment:
I suppose that my biggest sin is car driving . . . I do endeavor to recycle. I do 
endeavor to switch off appliances as much as I can, not use appliances when I 
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don’t need to, those kinds of things. I’m pretty sure that it doesn’t compensate 
for the more extreme damage that, potentially, a car does to the environment by 
doing what I do. I sort of think: “at least I am doing this.” (P25, male, 45-54 
years)
I found that one of the supermarkets was doing carrier bag recycling and I took 
them down to recycle and I thought “well that’s kind of made up for it a little 
bit.” I just think I feel better myself for doing it. (P10, female, 22-34 years)
Both these examples suggest that participants are aware of their negative 
impact on the environment, with one participant even using moral language 
(i.e., “my biggest sin”). However, phrases such as “at least I am doing this” 
indicate a tokenistic or perfunctory gesture toward acting pro-environmen-
tally, perhaps suggesting that participants are unwilling to invest much effort 
in compensating, but rather justify actions on the basis of compensation as a 
momentary and immediate means of resolving the dilemma.
Being able to justify undertaking environmentally detrimental actions was 
also deemed to be useful in social situations as it enabled participants to 
emphasize their green credentials even where evidence for their pro-environ-
mental behaviors was ambiguous:
If I’m put on the spot and if I was being interrogated about: “how much are you 
contributing?” I’d inevitably drift into self-justification-style language. (P13, 
male, 45-54 years)
Participants recognized that pro-environmental behaviors were morally 
and socially normative and were, therefore, viewed as desirable actions to be 
seen to perform:
I think today most people would want to be seen as being concerned . . . I think 
we would all try to make ourselves sound better in one respect by [citing] some 
of the things that we do that we believe to be, you know, beneficial to the 
environment. (P24, female, 35-44 years)
This observation may go some way toward explaining why people use or 
endorse retrospective CGBs; potentially, they serve a communicative func-
tion by explaining or justifying to others the performance of potentially stig-
matizing behavior(s).
When are people likely to use CGBs? There was evidence not only that 
participants viewed compensation between certain behaviors as socially 
and morally permissible (e.g., that eating in season produce could 
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compensate for also eating out of season produce) but also that they 
rejected the idea of compensation between other behaviors (e.g., driving 
less to compensate for drinking bottled water). Whether compensation 
was deemed to be allowable or not seemed to relate to the perceived 
morality of, and ease with which, a certain pro-environmental action 
could be performed. As found by Thøgersen (1996), some environmental 
behaviors (e.g., recycling or preventing waste) appear to be viewed as 
moral behaviors with the result that people’s beliefs tend to relate to what 
they view is “right”:
I see no reason why people wouldn’t recycle because all the facilities are 
available. I think if there’s nothing blocking you doing it, then you do have that 
moral obligation to do it. (P36, female, 22-34 years)
Some participants were also unwilling (at least publicly) to entertain the 
idea that any trade-off or compensation could be justified for relatively sim-
ple pro-environmental actions (e.g., sorting waste for recycling). Participants’ 
responses suggested that endorsing notions of compensation was easier when 
(a) acting more pro-environmentally was deemed to be either difficult or per-
sonally costly or (b) where acting in an environmentally detrimental way was 
seen as unavoidable:
I do think there are occasions when you need to get to a place and it’s out of the 
way and you can only really drive a car to that place [ . . . ] then you would 
maybe think of trying to lower it down [car use] and balance it out by using less 
on other occasions. (P03, female, 22-34 years)
If it’s unavoidable, at least you can help [by compensating]. (P25, male, 45-54 
years)
Other forms of justification. It is also worth noting that participants also justi-
fied acting in an environmentally detrimental manner in a number of other 
(noncompensatory) ways. For example, participants sometimes pointed to (a) 
the difficulty or impracticality of the pro-environmental option (e.g., as found 
by Gifford, 2011) or (b) a lack of perceived and actual behavioral control 
(e.g., as emphasized by the Theory of Planned Behavior; Ajzen, 1985) as 
reasons for not acting pro-environmentally. In such cases, participants often 
drew attention to circumstances that prevented them from acting in pro-envi-
ronmental ways or to more important goals (e.g., the needs of family mem-
bers) that necessitated (and hence justified) acting in environmentally 
detrimental ways:
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I need to have a car, my very elderly mother is now on her own and I need to 
be a phone call away from her which means I need to be literally five minutes 
away from her. I haven’t got time to be waiting for a bus. (P37, female, 35-44 
years)
Some participants took a fatalistic view, arguing that nothing could be 
done to remediate certain environmental impacts, and/or that their personal 
contributions to affecting change would be relatively insignificant. This type 
of response has been identified by other studies (e.g., Gifford, 2011; 
Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007) and seems to stem from a 
lack of self-efficacy (belief in one’s ability to perform a task or make a differ-
ence; Bandura, 1977). For example, one participant argued that attempting to 
compensate for a long haul flight was pointless because even off-setting a 
short flight would be difficult:
I do know from my carbon output charts . . . that just one short European 
flight—the amount of carbon that it bangs on that month is huge, so no you 
can’t really compensate. (P05, male, 65 years or above)
Similarly, some participants felt helpless due to the global scale of envi-
ronmental problems and saw their own actions as a “drop in the ocean” (e.g., 
Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Focusing on the scale of issues and the perceived 
negative environmental impact of others’ actions seemed to help participants 
to maintain their sense of personal moral value and to minimize feelings of 
guilt and personal responsibility (see also discussions by Gifford, 2011; 
Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012):
[With] countries like China doing whatever they want—whether you’ve got an 
efficient appliance in your house isn’t really going to make such a difference. 
(P27, female, 34-44 years)
Finally, some participants felt that they deserved, or were entitled to, par-
ticipate in certain highly desirable behaviors (see, Taylor, Webb, & Sheeran, 
2014, for similar findings in relation to health behavior) and so did not need 
to compensate for so doing:
Flying on holiday is something that if you want to go far enough and that’s 
something that you have to do you shouldn’t have to balance stuff out in order 
to do that. (P01, male, 22-34 years)
In short, although participants felt that it was unacceptable to not under-
take behaviors that are relatively easy (e.g., recycling), they expected—or 
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even felt entitled—to be able to undertake behaviors such as foreign travel 
that potentially have a larger negative impact.
Discussion
The present research investigated how people think about and justify behav-
ing in ways that potentially have a negative impact on the environment. Our 
specific focus was on notions of compensation, or the idea that pro-environ-
mental behavior might (to some extent) be seen to compensate for (or off-set) 
environmentally detrimental behavior(s).
Although participants’ written responses suggested that they typically dis-
agreed with statements describing compensatory actions, their verbal 
responses suggested that there were occasions where they entertained the 
prospect of compensation; that is, they considered striking a balance between 
their more and less pro-environmental behaviors. Our findings suggested that 
endorsement and use of CGBs was determined, to an extent, by (a) how desir-
able the behavior in question was deemed to be (participants reported being 
more likely to compensate for moderately desirable behaviors, such as car 
use, but not highly desirable behaviors such as flying abroad on holiday), (b) 
the relative difficulty of pro-environmental actions (participants felt that not 
undertaking relatively easy behaviors, such as recycling, could not be justi-
fied), (c) moral and social norms associated with the behavior (these encour-
aged people to justify—or be seen to justify—behaviors that could have a 
negative impact on the environment), and (d) the relative availability and/or 
suitability of other ways to justify the behavior, such as the needs of family 
members (participants were less likely to compensate when they could justify 
their behavior in other ways).
The Nature of CGBs
The present research extends ideas of compensation, primarily developed in 
the literature on health behavior, to environmentally significant behaviors. 
Research on health behaviors suggests that compensatory beliefs tend to be 
activated when people experience a conflict between their goals, values, and 
more immediate desires. In instances where a behavior is very tempting (e.g., 
being offered a free glass of champagne), the desirability of the behavior 
alone should provide sufficient reason to act (e.g., “I have to do this”). 
Similarly, where a course of action is not very tempting (e.g., going for a 
cycle ride in wet weather), then it is unlikely that a self-regulatory dilemma 
will occur, and there is no need to justify not engaging in the behavior. 
Dilemmas are most likely to occur, therefore, when a behavior is 
16 Environment and Behavior 0(0)
“moderately” tempting (e.g., enjoying a biscuit with a cup of tea; Rabiau 
et al., 2006). In such situations, people may try to resolve the dilemma by 
reasoning that they can indulge now and compensate later, or indulge now 
because they previously acted in virtuous ways. The present research sug-
gests that compensatory beliefs within an environmental domain work in a 
similar fashion. That is, CGBs constitute a strategy to reduce feelings (or 
anticipated feelings) of guilt associated with not behaving as pro-environ-
mentally as perhaps they could (e.g., putting recyclable material in the trash, 
driving a sports car).
Fuzzy accounting. One key finding relates to the potentially inaccurate and 
imprecise nature of the trade-offs that participants were willing to con-
sider. This imprecision likely stemmed from the (understandable) chal-
lenge of evaluating the accuracy of the potential compensations presented 
during the think-aloud exercise. Indeed, we found evidence that some par-
ticipants actually suspected that their compensatory beliefs might be inac-
curate and/or ineffective. Notably, however, they were still willing to 
endorse them. This is similar to findings from research into compensatory 
health beliefs. Kaklamanou et al. (2013), for instance, found that although 
participants doubted the efficacy of some of their compensatory behaviors 
(e.g., the extent to which exercising would compensate for smoking), it did 
not prevent them from using such notions of compensation to justify their 
actions.
More generally, it appeared that participants in the present research com-
pensated in quite vague and cumulative ways (e.g., trading off a future behav-
ioral indiscretion against a larger number of historical positive behaviors). 
Such general beliefs could be seen to constitute a form of lazy or fuzzy 
accounting, allowing people to appear (to themselves and to others) to pos-
sess green credentials, without having to make significant changes to their 
lifestyle (for similar ideas, see Beattie, 2010, on “green fakers” and Gifford, 
2011, on tokenism). Arguably, in such contexts, the term compensatory belief 
is a bit of a misnomer because people do not necessarily believe in the com-
pensations that they endorse—rather they simply employ them as a conve-
nient way to justify their behavior.
Somewhat ironically, it appears that such compensatory strategies are 
used because people care about the environment and feel uncomfortable 
about contributing to environmental problems. Although justifying actions 
that potentially harm the environment is concerning, Thøgersen (1999) 
argues that the use of justifications can also be seen more positively. Namely, 
to the extent that people feel a need to justify or excuse their behavior, the use 
of compensatory beliefs could be seen as a “partial yielding,” or 
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acknowledgment that individuals ought to change their behavior (Thøgersen, 
1999; van Raaij, 1995). Such people are likely to be easier to persuade to 
change their behavior compared with those who do not feel any dissonance/
guilt about environmentally detrimental actions. In short, the endorsement 
and use of CGBs could suggest that people are at least aware of the potential 
impact of their actions on the environment and could be persuaded to con-
sider changing their behavior.
Temporal focus. Participants’ responses in the present research suggested that 
beliefs about compensation in relation to health and environmental behaviors 
may have a different temporal focus. Although compensation in health 
domains is often associated with forming intentions to compensate in the 
future (e.g., Radtke, Scholz, Keller, & Hornung, 2012), participants in the 
present research principally endorsed retrospective forms of compensation 
(e.g., reasoning that the sum of their past pro-environmental actions might 
compensate for their current [and ongoing] negative environmental behavior; 
McGregor, 2008). In short, rather than a “credit card” strategy (i.e., where 
people engage in a behavior under the promise that they will pay off their 
“debt” at a later time), participants could be seen to be using a “piggy bank” 
approach with respect to environmental actions, whereby numerous past 
small actions are viewed to build-up credit that can be used to justify engag-
ing in environmentally detrimental, but otherwise desirable, behaviors (e.g., 
driving).
There are a number of potential explanations for the finding that retro-
spective compensations were principally endorsed that could be further 
explored in future research.
First, pro-environmental actions are generally seen to be morally right 
and socially desirable (Lindenberg & Steg, 2013). For this reason, engag-
ing in an environmentally detrimental action now (i.e., acting immorally 
or undesirably) on the promise that one will off-set the damage in the 
future, is likely to be viewed as less appealing than directly pointing to 
concrete evidence suggestive of green credentials before acting (Miller & 
Effron, 2010). Alternatively (or in addition), it is possible that the com-
plexity of identifying the outcomes of personal behaviors (e.g., recycling) 
on the environment (compared with the complexity of identifying the 
impact of actions on health) may mean that people may (a) simply find it 
more difficult or confusing to plan to off-set negative behaviors than to 
refer to past actions or (b) not fully realize the environmental implications 
of their behavior(s) until they have begun to act, thus necessitating a quick 
(and not necessarily well considered) rationale for their action (De Witt 
Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2014).
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Acceptability of compensation. Some forms of compensation seemed to be 
more acceptable than others. This finding might be interpreted in relation 
to the literature on “minimal” versus “maximal” moral standards (Kessler 
et al., 2010). Minimal standards are those that have an absolute cutoff 
point for appropriate behavior. In other words, a behavior is either seen as 
acceptable or unacceptable, with no gray area. It would seem that partici-
pants in the present research judged recycling according to such minimal 
standards (i.e., reasoning that, because recycling is easy, there is no excuse 
for not doing it). In contrast, maximal values focus on the extent of devia-
tion from a moral standard. Travel behaviors appeared to be judged using 
these maximal standards (e.g., it is okay to drive now because I took the 
bus earlier).
Implications of the Present Research for Improving Measures of 
CGBs
Although we found evidence that people both described and, at times, 
endorsed CGBs, agreement with individual statements was relatively low, 
which may indicate that the measure might be improved. One issue is that 
some of the behaviors described in the CGB measure (e.g., recycling behav-
ior) were viewed as minimal moral standards by some participants. As a con-
sequence, participants may have been unwilling (at least publically) to 
consider them as candidates for compensation. Another issue was that some 
participants found it challenging to assess statements that were relatively spe-
cific and/or occurred across domains (e.g., balancing out unsustainable trans-
port by conserving water). There are two potential problems here. First, a 
high degree of environmental literacy (Roth, 1992) is required to assess spe-
cific and/or cross-domain compensations. Second, our research suggests that 
people tend to think in a less prescribed way about balancing their impacts. 
Importantly, where participants considered more specific compensations, 
these tended to be within a particular domain (e.g., between more and less 
sustainable transport options). A final issue pertained to the response options. 
Participants often wanted to specify how frequently compensation would be 
acceptable. However, they were asked to choose a number to indicate their 
agreement with each statement without any opportunity to explain, or qualify 
their responses.
It is possible that these issues might be overcome by (a) rewording state-
ments to provide the information required to weigh up the environmental con-
sequences of different behaviors (e.g., “Not eating meat reduces personal 
carbon emissions and can thus compensate for those generated by flying abroad 
on holiday”), (b) developing more statements describing within-domain 
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compensations (or explicitly comparing the extent to which participants 
endorse compensations within vs. between domains), and (c) modifying the 
response options to reflect the frequency with which the compensation is 
deemed to be permissible (i.e., “How often is it okay to compensate?”). A more 
substantial change to the assessment of CGBs—but one that would recognize 
the idiosyncratic and more general nature of people’s compensatory beliefs—
would be to rephrase statements so as to allow participants to describe their 
own compensatory beliefs. This could be done using a stem-completion task, 
where participants are allowed to specify the behaviors that they engage in that 
might compensate for their environmental indiscretions (e.g., “The effects of 
driving on the environment can be compensated for by . . .”; see Byrka & 
Kaminska, 2015, for a similar approach).
Limitations and Future Directions
It is worth noting a number of limitations in the present research. First, our 
participants tended to have a reasonably strong green identity and a pro-eco-
logical worldview. Although we found evidence of CGBs, stronger endorse-
ment of CGBs is likely to have been evident in a less pro-environmental 
sample (Rabiau et al., 2006).
Second, our sample of 40 participants was relatively small when com-
pared with quantitative studies in this area (e.g., Bratt, 1999; Kaklamanou 
et al., 2015). This limits the extent to which the findings can be generalized 
and prevented us from using inferential statistics to compare participants’ 
beliefs as a function of demographic characteristics, levels of green identity, 
and so on. However, the purpose of the present research was to complement 
research employing larger scale survey designs to provide more exploratory, 
in-depth insights into how people rationalize and justify their environmen-
tally detrimental actions. These insights can be used to better understand the 
findings of previous work (e.g., Bratt, 1999; Kaklamanou et al., 2015) and to 
inform the design of future studies in this area, which could include surveys 
conducted on larger, more representative samples.
Another limitation is that participants may have found it difficult to recall 
particular occurrences of environmental behavior and to introspect as to the 
reasons for these actions (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Although this is possible, 
participants tended to provide relatively rich descriptions of their beliefs and 
behavior that seemed to suggest a good degree of insight. Similarly, although 
concerns about social desirability and demand effects are generally an issue 
with self-report measures, especially those completed in the presence of a 
researcher, we were often struck by the honesty of participants’ responses and 
the extent to which they were prepared to admit to not behaving as they 
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perhaps intended or desired. Future research might, however, consider a more 
in-depth, discursive approach, looking at how participants’ accounts of their 
behavior are constructed and shaped by social interactions (Adams, 2014).
A final limitation concerns the extent to which compensation is a conscious, 
effortful strategy that is amenable to self-report (cf. the issues described above). 
Although there is evidence that people knowingly and willingly deviate from their 
goals by providing rationalizations, there is also evidence that some balancing 
processes (e.g., compensating, purging, licensing) may operate at a subconscious 
level. For example, Taylor et al. (2014) found that people could be primed (outside 
their conscious awareness) to use justifications. Although the current research was 
designed to learn more about the nature of cognitive rationalizations, and specifi-
cally, the use of compensatory beliefs as a mechanism for self-licensing environ-
mentally detrimental behavior, the methods employed here (i.e., think-aloud 
procedures and interviewing) are not suited to identifying implicit instances of 
compensatory beliefs. Future work, however, could probe this with experimental 
methods (e.g., by testing self-regulatory behavior in relation to pro-environmental 
goals, after priming the use of justifications in another context; Taylor et al., 2014).
Conclusion
The present research contributes to our understanding of why people knowingly 
engage in environmentally detrimental actions that contravene their good inten-
tions. The primary contribution is evidence on whether, when, why, and how 
people endorse notions of compensation with respect to environmental behav-
ior. Our findings suggest that CGBs are triggered when people feel the need to 
justify their pro-environmental credentials to themselves or others, and when 
doing so will not incur social sanctions. The findings point to similarities and 
differences between compensatory beliefs in health and environmental domains. 
Specifically, CGBs, like compensatory health beliefs, appear to be a way for 
people to deal with the resultant or anticipated feelings of dissonance associated 
with acting in ways that are ostensibly inconsistent with their goals. However, 
the present findings suggest that CGBs also have an additional moral dimension. 
That is, people use CGBs to demonstrate their moral character to themselves or 
to others. Finally, the findings suggest that current measures may not adequately 
capture the extent to which people endorse CGBs and we make a number of 
specific suggestions to improve such measures.
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